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ST. JOHN'S
LAW REVIEW
VOLUME XVII APRIL, 1943 NUMBER 2
THE CONDUCT OF CORPORATE ELECTIONS
T HE annual election of directors in corporations having
many stockholders generates problems that are not unlike
the problems arising from the conduct of political elections.
But whereas the conduct of political elections is narrowly
protected by statutory enactments,' corporate elections are,
for the most part, conducted under the personal jurisdiction
of corporate management and its lawyers.
It is not surprising, therefore, that with the recent. gov-
ernmental trend toward the supervision of corporate activi-
ties, at least in their financial aspects, there should also appear
an increasing awareness of the need for the supervision of
corporate elections. The twin evils of apathy and lack of
adequate information beset the average corporate stockholder
and prevent him from exercising an intelligent choice in the
selection of corporate directors. Nor do we have, in the case
of private corporations, the assistance of an alert and critical
press, the facilities of the radio, nor the activities of public-
spirited men, all devoted to the task of enlightening the
voters. Stockholders are dependent for their knowledge with
respect to the merits of particular candidates upon informa-
ti4n supplied by the candidates themselves or by rival inter-
ests who desire to replace existing management.
The usual proxy contest, as far as the individual stock-
holder is concerned, consists in the receipt by him of numer-
ISee, for example, the Election Law of the State of New York, being
Chapter 17 of McKinney's Consolidated Laws, prescribing forms of ballots
and rules with respect to the preservation of books and papers, Sections 100-124,
and giving detail regulations with respect to the conduct of elections, Sections
190-229.
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ous letters from rival candidates for office. Frequently, the
letters are confusing; often, they flatly contradict each other.
The stockholders frequently find it impossible to ascertain
the facts, or at least to credit the representations by compet-
ing claimants to office. Where personal solicitors are employed,
it is, of course, impossible to control extravagant claims made
by them to induce stockholders to vote, and there are few
opportunities for the average stockholder to check these
claims. Professional proxy solicitors, a well paid sector of
the financial community, are skilled in the knowledge of the
psychology of corporate investors and know just what type
of argument to make that would appeal most to them.
The apathy of the average stockholder arises from the
realization that his small stockholding could hardly affect
the result and the feeling that the situation is, in any event,
controlled by the larger stockholders. It is for this reason
that frequently the ownership of only 10% of the outstand-
ing stock is sufficient to secure a majority of votes, sufficient
to elect the board.
There is an amazing paucity of statutory regulations
with respect to the conduct of corporate elections. In New
York, for example, the election need not be held at all, unless
it is demanded by some stockholder, and the conduct of the
election itself, the manner of voting and the form and contents
of notices and requests for proxies, are practically without
statutory prescription. 2 Nor are there more extensive provi-
sions in other states. What protection there is, derives from
the new administrative controls set up by the Securities and
Exchange Commission,3 from certain established principles
of law, and from the strong arm of equity, interposed when
the results of elections are challenged in the courts. The
analysis of these safeguards and the evaluation of their util-
ity and effectiveness is the subject matter of this paper.
2 The right to vote by proxy is in New York provided for in Section 19 of
the General Corporation Law, and the only provision with respect to it is that
the proxy must be in writing and shall not be valid after the expiration of
eleven months from its date, and shall be revocable at pleasure. No other regu-
lations with respect to the proxy are contained in the statute.
3 See the SECURrEs AcT oF 1934, U. S. C. A., tit. 15, § 78n, giving to the
Securities and Exchange Commission the right to make rules and regulations
with respect to proxies, and providing that no one shall solicit or give a proxy
unless in conformity with such regulations.
[ VOL. 17
1943] CONDUCT OF CORPORATE ELECTIONS 77
QUORum
The first essential of a proper election of directors is, of
course, the presence of a quorum at the meeting. There seems
to have been no rule at common law with respect to the num-
ber of shareholders required to constitute a quorum, and a
plurality of those actually present at the meeting was gener-
ally deemed sufficient to effect a valid election.4 This has been
changed by statute in most states, which now generally pro-
vide that the by-laws may fix the percentage of the stockhold-
ers necessary to constitute a quorum.5 In New York, the
statute provides that the by-laws "may fix the number of
shares, not exceeding a majority necessary to constitute a
quorum". But even this salutary provision may be easily
evaded. It will be noted that Section 55 of the Stock Corpo-
ration Law, which authorizes the inclusion in the by-laws of
a provision fixing the percentage of shareholders that might
constitute a quorum, applies only to the regular meeting of
stockholders. But this regular annual meeting need not, as
we have seen, be held, and the only penalty for not holding it
is that the stockholders may demand that a special meeting
be called for the election of directors.6
4 2 KENT's Coamm. *293. As a matter of fact, until the adoption of Section
55 of the Stock Corporation Law in 1930, the New York statute likewise pro-
vided that "the directors of every stock corporation shall be chosen at the time
and place fixed by the by-laws of the corporation by a plurality of votes at
such elecfrn" (former § 25, STOCK CoRP. LAW).
Under that section, it was held that a by-law making a fixed percentage of
the outstanding stock necessary for a quorum was invalid as in conflict with the
statute (Matter of Keogh, Inc., 192 App. Div. 624 [1920]; Matter of Rapid
Transit Ferry Co., 15 App. Div. 530 [1897]; Ripin v. U. S. Woven Label Co.,
205 N. Y. 442 [1912]; Matter of Boulevard Theatre & Realty Co., 195 App.
Div. 518, 186 N. Y. Supp. 430, aff'd without opinion, 231 N. Y. 615, 132 N. E.
910 [1921]).
5 N. Y. STOCK CoRP. LAW § 55. See, however, in the case of special elec-
tions, Section 23 of the General Corporation Law, providing that those attending
shall constitute a quorum. COLO. CORP. LAW § 27; KANSAs G. S. SuPP.
§ 17-3305; Louisiana, L. 1928, Act 250, § 31; Ohio, G. C. § 8623-43; Rhode
Island, G. C. § 22; South Carolina, C. L. § 7679; Utah, § 18-2-42; Vermont,
§ 5811 ; Virginia, Code § 3796.
6 The New York statute, Section 55 of the Stock Corporation Law, limits
the power of the by-laws by providing that a quorum may not exceed a majority.
The only provision, however, for failing to call the annual meeting for the
election of directors is contained in Section 22 of the General Corporation Law,
which provides that the directors shall forthwith call a special meeting for the
election of directors or, upon their failure to do so, any member of the corpo-
ration may call such meeting. At special meetings, however, Section 23 of the
General Corporation Law provides that "the members attending shall constitute
a quorum".
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With regard to special meetings, Section 23 of the Gen-
eral Corporation Law applies, and by its terms, those attend-
ing constitute a quorum. It has been held that a by-law in
conflict with Section 23 of the General Corporation Law is
invalid. 7 Accordingly, a simple method is available to the
management of a corporation for avoiding the limitations
with respect to a quorum contained in the by-laws. All that
is needed is that the management shall fail to call the annual
meeting and when a special meeting is demanded, Section 23
of the General Corporation Law specifically provides that
those attending shall constitute a quorum. Since this section
supersedes any contradictory by-law that may exist, the man-
agement is thus enabled to conduct an election without the
limitations contained in the by-laws with respect to a
quorum."
In practice, this device is not commonly used as it might
work against the management as often as it does for it. But
the existence of the possibility is a defect in our statutory
scheme, not contemplated by the law makers and should, of
course, be corrected.
INSPECTORS OF ELECTION
The ballots which are cast at a corporate meeting for
the election of directors are generally tabulated by officials
who, in this state at least, are called inspectors of election.9
7 See Matter of Rapid Transit Ferry Co., 15 App. Div. 530, 44 N. Y. Supp.
539 (1897); Reiss v. Levy, 175 App. Div. 938, 161 N. Y. Supp. 1048 (1916).
8 As a matter of fact, the General Corporation Law of Nebraska, Section
31, specifically enacts the possibility of this evasion. The statute provides that
"If the election for directors of any such corporation shall not be
held on the day designated by the by-laws, the directors shall cause the
election to be held as soon thereafter as conveniently may be; . . . and
at such election the shares of stock represented at such meeting, either in
person or by proxy, shall constitute a quorum for the purpose of such
election notwithstanding any provision of the by-laws of the corporation
to the contrary."
9 Section 20 of the General Corporation Law authorizes the inspector of
election to administer an oath to anyone whose vote is challenged.
Section 23 of the General Corporation Law authorizes those present at a
special meeting to elect inspectors.
Section 24 of the General Corporation Law requires the inspectors to file
a certificate, giving the result of the election together with their oath as
inspectors.
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The method of selecting inspectors of election is frequently
provided for in the by-laws. They are required to take an
oath to the effect that they will impartially and fairly con-
duct the election and tabulate the votes, and are authorized
to administer an oath of regularity to any stockholder or
proxy holder whose vote is challenged. Here again, there are
no safeguards which may be employed at the meeting by
minority groups to insure a fair count. But since the action
of the inspectors is, as we shall see, reviewable in court and
fraudulent conduct on the part of the inspectors would con-
stitute a violation of the criminal law, it may perhaps not be
necessary, in the ordinary case, to provide for any official
safeguards with respect to the conduct of the inspectors.
However, there appears to be some need for legislation re-
quiring the inspectors to keep their records and to make
available the ballots which have been cast to examination by
any dissatisfied stockholder.
The duties of the inspectors with respect to counting the
votes are largely ministerial. It is not for them to say whether
a particular shareholder or proxy holder has the right to cast
his vote or whether the proxy was properly obtained or
whether any other equities exist sufficient to disfranchise the
particular voter.10 They are governed by the provisions of
Section 47 of the Stock Corporation Law. This section gives
every stockholder of record a vote for every share of stock
that he owns, either in person or by proxy. All that the in-
spectors, therefore, are required to do is to consult the official
list of stockholders and to make sure that the tendered ballots
are signed by stockholders whose names appear on the official
Section 46 of the Stock Corporation Law provides for the appointment of
inspectors, as provided in the by-laws, or, upon failure of such provision, the
stockholders may by a per capita vote choose temporary inspectors. Inspectors
are entitled to reasonable compensation.
10 Section 47 of the Stock Corporation Law provides that each shareholder
of record shall be entitled, at every meeting of the corporation, to one vote
for each share of stock recorded in his name. It also provides that such share-
holder may vote in person or by proxy, and also provides that the owner of
stock which stands in the name of another may demand from such other a
proxy to vote thereon. It also gives to the inspectors the right of examining
the original stock books of the corporation. The duties of the inspector under
this section are, therefore, to compare the votes cast with the stock records of
the corporation, and if the votes are in accordance with Section 47, they are
valid and must be counted.
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list, or that the proxies which are offered by proxy holders
are signed in like manner.
In spite, however, of the apparent simplicity of this task,
numerous questions arise which the inspectors must resolve.
May the administrator or executor of an estate vote or sign
a proxy for shares standing in the name of the decedent;11
may one of two joint owners of stock vote the shares on behalf
of both;12 what shall be done with undated proxies; 13 what
disposition shall be made of two proxies from the same stock-
holder, running to different persons, signed apparently on
the same date ;14 what shall be done with informal proxies,
such as proxies which are not witnessed or which are con-
tained in a telegram? 15 Some of these questions find ready
answers in the decisions, as we have noted in the margin.
Others are the subject of conflicting authority. These prob-
lems, however, are of comparatively minor importance since
in large corporations, at least, the number of such proxies is
very seldom large enough to affect the result.
Once the inspectors have filed their report, it is the duty
of the presiding officer to declare the candidates having re-
ceived a plurality of votes to be elected.
JUDICIAL REVIEW
The method of contesting the result of an election is, in
most states, a proceeding in the nature of quo wa.rranto, to
II Apparently, in order to permit an executor or administrator to vote, his
letters testamentary, or a copy of the will with his authority, should accompany
the proxy or be provided shortly after the election. See Warner v. Hoagland,
51 N. J. L. 62 (1888).
12 That the consent of all the joint owners of stock is necessary to vote it,
see Hey v. Dolphin, 92 Hun 230 (N. Y. 1895) ; Matter of Pioneer Paper Co.,
36 How. Pr. 111 (N. Y. 1865). But it has also been held that a share of stock
held in the name of two or more persons may be voted under a proxy given by
one of them (Gow v. Consolidated Copper Mines Corp., 19 Del. Ch. 172, 165
AtI. 136 [1933]).
13 In re Election of Directors of St. Lawrence Steamboat Co., 44 N. J. L.
529 (1882).
14 Apparently a later proxy revokes an earlier; but if the proxies do not
show which one is later because they are both undated, or both dated on the
same day, they must both be rejected (Pope v. Whitridge, 110 Md. 468 [1909]).
15 Smith v. San Francisco & N. P. Ry., 115 Cal. 584, 47 Pac. 582 (1897) ;
Gentry-Futch Co. v. Gentry, 90 Fla. 595, 106 So. 473 (1925) ; In re Election of
Directors of St. Lawrence Steamboat Co., 44 N. J. L. 529 (1882).
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try the title of the directors to their office. 16 In New York
and in many other states, however, there are specific statu-
tory proceedings for the review of corporate elections. Thus,
Section 25 of the General Corporation Law authorizes the
Supreme Court, upon application of any member aggrieved
by an election, and upon notice to the persons who have been
declared elected thereat, to hear proof with respect to the
propriety of an election and to make an order either confirm-
ing the election or ordering a new election, as the justice of
the case may require.'1
The scope of this review and the relief to be secured
thereunder has been the subject of considerable litigation.
Some have taken a broader view of the powers of the Supreme
Court under this section.
It is, first of all, important to point out that a proceed-
ing under Section 25 of the General Corporation Law cannot
be availed of for the purpose of trying title or settling equi-
ties between rival claimants to particular shares of stock.' 8
For the solution of such problems, the litigants are relegated
to the ordinary remedies at law and in equity. Here, the
court is only concerned with the propriety and fairness of
the election.
Again, it should be remembered that if the petition, even
if granted, would not have the effect of changing the result
of the election, the court will not consider it. No matter
what errors the inspectors may have made or what irregu-
26 See CAL CIVIL CODE § 312; DEL. GEN. Coap. LAW § 31; Mo. REv. STAT.
1919, § 9767; N. J. Coau p=u STAT. 1910, p. 1624, § 42; N. Y. GEN. CORP. LAW
§ 25; N. C. CONSOL. STAT. 1919, § 1177; R. I. GEN. L. § 5778; VA. CODE OF
1930, § 3804.
The common law rule required the bringing of quo warranto in the name
of the People. Elberta Oil Co. v. Superior Court of California in and for
Kings County, 74 Cal. App. 114, 239 Pac. 415 (1925).
17 General Corporation Law, Section 25, reads as follows:
"Powers of supreme court respecting elections. Upon the application
of any member aggrieved by an election, and upon notice to the persons
declared elected thereat, the corporation and such other persons as the
court may direct, the supreme court at a special term thereof shall forth-
with hear the proofs and allegations of the parties, and confirm the
election or order a new election, as justice may require."
28 Matter of Utica Fire Alarm Teleg. Co., 115 App. Div. 821 (1906). In
this case, the court pointed out that where the right to vote is involved, the
record ownership of the stock is controlling, and that equities between the
record owners and others cannot be settled in a proceeding under Section 25 of
the General Corporation Law.
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larities may have existed in the tabulation of the votes, they
are of no consequence if the result would have been the same
in any event.19
The court, unlike the inspectors, is not bound to perform
a mere ministerial act of reviewing the c6unt. The court may
disregard forged proxies; may take evidence with respect to
the problem of whether the person who voted is in fact the
same person whose name appears on the official list; may
pass upon the authority of fiduciaries to cast votes; and,
above all, as has been held in recent years, may enter into
the vexatious problem of determining whether any fraud or
overreaching has been practiced in connection with the con-
duct of the election, either at the meeting or prior thereto.20
The chief problem in respect to this last matter is to ascer-
tain whether the contending parties have resorted to any
overreaching in the campaign for votes or proxies; whether
there has been any misstatement or concealment of impor-
tant or relevant matters from the security holders, and
whether the campaigns were conducted in a fair and equi-
table manner.
Laying aside, for a moment, the numerous difficulties
that would beset a petitioner in order to prove the nature of
an unfair campaign for election, we shall first consider what
it is that the courts have on the whole regarded as unfair.
19 Matter of Argus Co., 138 N. Y. 557 (1893) ; People ex reL. Osborn v.
Tuthill, 31 N. Y. 550 (1864); Philips v. Wickham, 1 Paige 590 (N. Y. 1829).
20 Matter of Kaminsky, 251 App. Div. 132, 295 N. Y. Supp. 989 (1937),
rearg. denied, 251 App. Div. 795, 298 N. Y. Supp. 171 (1937), aff'd, 277 N. Y.
524, 13 N. E. (2d) 456 (1938) ; Matter of Bogart, 215 App. Div. 45, 213 N. Y.
Supp. 137 (1925) ; In re Green Bus Lines, 166 Misc. 800, 2 N. Y. S. (2d) 556(1937) ; In re Flushing Hospital & Dispensary, 27 N. Y. S. (2d) 207 (1941),
aff'd, 28 N. Y. S. (2d) 155 (1941), rearg. denied, 29 N. Y. S. (2d) 151 (1941),
mod'd on other grounds and aff'd, 288 N. Y. 125, 41 N. E. (2d) 917 (1942) ;
Matter of Prophet, 236 App. Div. 524, 260 N. Y. Supp. 239 (1932) ; Di Silvestro
v. Sons of Italy Grand Lodge, 130 Misc. 494, 223 N. Y. Supp. 791 (1927).
For the same rule in other states, see Pierce Oil Corp. v. Voran (Va.),
118 S. E. 247 (1923); Stratford v. Mallory, 70 N. J. L. 294 (1904); In re
Zeniterm Co., 95 N. J. L. 297 (1921); Lawrence v. I. N. Parlier Estate Co.
(Calif.), 100 Pac. (2d) 765 (1940).
In the following cases, however, it was held that the interposition of equity
to determine the validity of an election will only be permitted as an incident to
a suit for other relief: Nathan v. Tompkins, 82 Ala. 437, 2 So. 747 (1887);
Sheehy v. Barry, 87 Conn. 656, 89 Atl. 259 (1914) ; Walker v. Johnson, 17 App.
Cas. 144 (D. C.) ; Gentry-Futch Co. v. Gentry, 90 Fla. 595, 106 So. 473 (1925);
Chicago Macaroni Manufacturing Co. v. Boggiano, 202 Ill. 312, 67 N. E. 17
(1903).
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General statements are not wanting. Thus, the Appellate
Division, in a case subsequently affirmed in the Court of
Appeals, said:
On the other hand, if reasonable grounds exist to indicate that the
election under review has not been conducted in a proper, regular or
fair manner, it should not be confirmed. If the result is not free
from suspicion, or is clouded with doubt, and justice demands, we
may in all fairness require the parties to start over again. When
right, justice and fair play require, a new election should be ordered.21
It will be observed that this statement, which succinctly
states the law, at least in this jurisdiction, is very broad and
will of necessity suggest many problems in an effort to apply
the principle to various states of fact. The essence of the
doctrine, however, is not difficult to analyze. Under it, the
chancellor exerts his power to assure to the stockholders of a
corporation the full enjoyment of their legal right freely to
express and effectuate their wishes in regard to a corporate
election.
Strangely enough, until very recently, there was not a
single instance in which a corporate election in a business
corporation has been set aside on this equitable ground. The
gap was filled recently in a case decided by Mr. Justice
Hofstadter, in the Supreme Court in New York County.
Here, the result of an election was challenged on the ground
that the proxies voted for the successful candidates had been
obtained by overreaching and concealment. The specific acts
of overreaching and concealment were comparatively simple.
They consisted of a statement contained in a letter sent by a
committee to the stockholders, the veracity of which was
challenged, and of the failure to disclose that a brokerage
house, which had written to the stockholders recommending
the successful candidates, had received compensation there-
for not from the candidates but from their backers. The
false statement was as follows:
Mr. Scheuer refers to the reduction in the net earnings, notably dur-
ing the past two years. However, he fails to point out that in these
two years over $60,000 was charged against earnings because of
21 See In re Kaminsky, =pra note 20, at pp. 139-140.
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improvements and the new equipment and furniture and the mainte-
nance thereof.
The facts, as proved at the trial before the special mas-
ter, were that $60,000 had indeed been spent but that the sum
had been charged to capital and not deducted from earnings,
and could not be utilized as a mode of explaining the decline
in earnings. It was, however, true that the maintenance of
the new equipment would explain a large portion of the
$60,000, and this item was charged against earnings. Never-
theless, the special master, in considering this aspect of the
case, said:
This statement was definitely inaccurate and misleading. Not
one penny was charged against earnings by reason of the purchase of
new equipment and furniture, or either of them, for these items were
capitalized. Mr. Bennett of Barrow, Wade, Guthrie & Co., accoun-
tants for the corporation, admitted this point-blank. As to the main-
tenance item, the impression was given that this represented some
unusual expenditures for these two years. The entire inference cre-
ated was that these extraordinary items aggregating $60,000 accounted
for the decline in earnings, and that petitioner had given the stock-
holders a false picture by omitting to state this fact.
With respect to the concealment, the special master was
more outspoken. The letters were sent by a well known firm
of brokers to all of the security holders of the corporation,
and advised the election of the successful candidates. Noth-
ing in the letters was charged to be untrue, and the difficulty
was that the recipients were not advised that the brokerage
firm had received a small sum of money as consideration for
having written the letters. The special master characterized
these letters as "offensive communications", and said that in
his opinion, "whether unwittingly or not, a deception was
practiced upon the stockholders, which may well have influ-
enced a number of them." 22
This recent decision by a court of learning and ability is
a significant exposition of the principles of equity governing
the conduct of corporate elections. By the extrapolation of
its principles, the case will ultimately be seen to stand for
22 The case referred to is In the Matter of the Application of S. H. Scheuer
in respect to the Election of Directors of London Terrace, Inc., N. Y. L. J.,
Oct. 2, 1942.
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the proposition that rival candidates for election in corpora-
tions are compelled to make full disclosure of all the facts
and circumstances surrounding their candidacy, and that
concealment of material and essential facts, which might
have a tendency to sway the stockholders, is as pernicious as
actual misrepresentation. Both may be dealt with in equity
and may form the basis for ordering a new election.
ADmINISTRATIVE CONTROL
The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 conferred power on
the Securities and Exchange Commission, as we have seen
above, to adopt regulations with respect to the solicitation of
proxies.2 3 The Securities Commission early adopted regula-
tions with respect to the circumstances under which proxies
may be solicited. From time to time, these regulations have
been revised, and both the original regulations as well as the
revisions have been the subject of wide discussion in the
financial community. The general purpose of the regulations
has been to make available to security holders all of the in-
formation necessary to exercise a judgment with respect to
whether or not a proxy should be given to a particular solicit-
ing agency. The original regulations required merely the
filing of certain information with the Commission. Extensive
criticism, however, of the results obtained under these early
regulations, which led to the feeling among many that while
the regulations were being literally lived up to, their spirit
was being evaded, led to a movement for the revision of the
23 "78n. Proxies
(a) It shall be unlawful for any person, by the use of the mails or
by any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of any facility
of any national securities exchange or otherwise, to solicit or to permit
the use of his name to solicit any proxy or consent or authorization in
respect of any security (other than an exempted security) registered on
any national securities exchange in contravention of such rules and regu-
lations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in
the public interest or for the protection of investors.
(b) It shall be unlawful for any member of a national securities
exchange or any broker or dealer who transacts a business in securities
through the medium of any such member to give a proxy, consent, or
authorization in respect of any security registered on a national securities
exchange and carried for the account of a customer in contravention of
such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary
or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors."
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proxy regulations of the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion.2 4 As a result of this agitation, the Commission, on
October 18, 1942, announced a complete revision of its proxy
rules, effective January 15, 1943.25
These new regulations require soliciting agencies to fur-
nish each person who is solicited with specifically detailed
information, described in the regulations, and also require
the filing of this material with the Commission. Careful
adherence to the letter and spirit of these regulations, it is
argued, will result in making available to stockholders gen-
erally full and complete information, on the basis of which
they can exercise an intelligent judgment. It has, on the
other hand, been argued that the rules are so detailed and
onerous as to render it impossible for the management or
other soliciting agencies to comply with them, and that, in
any event, the detailed information required to be submitted
to the security holders is meaningless to most stockholders,
who are not versed in finance or in the intricacies of corpo-
rate management, or who do not have the time or opportunity
to make studies with respect to these matters.
It is too soon to be able to say what the practical result
or effect of these regulations has been upon the conduct of
corporate elections. The whole problem of the regulation of
corporate management, which gave rise to the creation of the
Securities and Exchange Commission, the Securities Act of
1934, the Investment Company Act, the Trust Indenture Act,
the Public Utility Holding Company Act, is still to a large
extent unsolved. The experiences being collected by the Com-
mission, however, will undoubtedly point the way toward
more democratic control of American business corporations.
MAURICE FINKELSTEIN.
Professor of Law,
St. John's University, School of Law.
24 "Your Investments", vol. 3, Sept. 1942, pp. 1-17.
25See SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE ComMIssION RELEAsE, Dec. 29, 1942,
Reg. X-14, et seq.
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